Knight of Faith vs Overman

For my final research paper, I have chosen to compare and contrast Friedrich Nietzsche’s overman with Soren Kierkegaard’s knight of faith As if a coroner were standing over a body, holding a cold hand in one and looking at his chain watch in the other, I hear Nietzsche say: God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it? – Nietzsche, the Gay Science, Section 125 As if conversing with Nietzsche I hear the response of Kierkegaard to be, God will never die, only faith in Him can, and has died, in you Nietzsche. To which Kierkegaard would add, but that’s only my perspective. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche each have views that respond to the issue of faith and the life lived by the individual. Kierkegaard’s view is called the knight of faith and Nietzsche’s called overman. The knight of faith is an individual who has placed complete faith in himself and in God. Kierkegaard argues that the knight of faith is the paradox, is the individual, absolutely nothing but the individual, without connections or pretensions. The knight of faith is the individual who is able to gracefully embrace life. Most people live dejectedly in worldly sorrow and joy; they are the ones who sit along the wall and do not join in the dance. The knights of infinity are dancers and possess elevation. They make the movements upward, and fall down again; and this too is no mean pastime, nor ungraceful to behold. But whenever they fall down they are not able at once to assume the posture, they vacillate an instant, and this vacillation shows that after all they are strangers in the world. This is more or less strikingly evident in proportion to the art they possess, but even the most artistic knights cannot altogether conceal this vacillation. One need not look at them when they are up in the air, but only the instant they touch or have touched the ground–then one recognizes them. But to be able to fall down in such a way that the same second it looks as if one were standing and walking, to transform the leap of life into a walk, absolutely to express the sublime in the pedestrian–that only the knight of faith can do–and this is the one and only prodigy. – Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, Nietzsche’s overman can be described as; overman has his own self, both his higher and lower natures, neither repressed. He has this, his world, to which he is faithful. He has the love of this life, in this world, without the illusions that this world is inferior. And he has his reflective mind that reinforces these ideas. I believe that Nietzsche would claim his perspective to better because his claim focuses on this world, the one known to exist, whereas Kierkegaard’s claim implies a next life. Nietzsche would argue that Kierkegaard’s claim has two assumptions, 1) that there may or may not be an after life, and 2) that it is superior to this life. I like Nietzsche’s view of overman; overman is strength incarnate, reveling in the beauties of this life while satisfying his desires, both worldly and not. But it begs me to ask the question, as long as the anticipation of the next life doesn't interfere with the enjoyment of this one, can an overman not love this life and carry this love so far to greatly anticipate the next life as possibly even more beautiful than this one? I would further like to challenge Nietzsche on the topic of morals, and his overman. Since there is no objective truth, there are no objective morals or values. One becomes free to create their own and this is precisely what overman does. Overman has his own set of morals and values. Unless the morals one lives by here on earth are different than those they live by in Heaven, I don't see a problem. And even then I don't see a problem, unless one desires Heaven with its values inferior to their own. If one enjoys the way they live here and Heaven takes those enjoyments and morals away, why would one desire to live in Heaven at all? Nietzsche professes that God is dead, meaning the very idea of God's salvation is no longer held in the world's belief. If this is so, then doesn't it imply that having religious faith is indeed a subjective act, if not the highest possible subjective act? The fewer people who truly believe only means that the objective uncertainty is greater. Since objective uncertainty is at a maximum, so too must be the will to believe and the passion by which to believe. If this does not require also the maximum amount of courage, I don't know what does. I also like Kierkegaard’s view, but his view as well again begs me to ask questions. Kierkegaard’s knight of faith is self sacrificing. Christianity's absurdity makes it harder to have faith than to not. It almost seems that faith is a response to the fear of being wrong about the afterlife. Better to believe in just case than not believe and burn for it. The very degree of doubt makes belief seem desperate. But strong God fearing people should not feel such apprehension for the next life. Now don't get me wrong, they shouldn't depend on the next life for salvation. They shouldn't even depend on the existence of the next life, for there may be none. But if so, one isn't even disappointed if the next life doesn't exist since this life gives them all the happiness they desire. The despair that, Kierkegaard speaks of, needn't exist if he grant the premise that God desires ones happiness in this life, and if he grant the human race the possibility of achieving this happiness, independent of the next and possible nonexistent life. Subjectivism says that it matters more how one believes than it does what or why we do. So if one believes fervently that one can be happy here, what God would impose that such subjectivity is wrong, that one can only be happy independently of this world? Nietzsche’s overman has this courageous independence, but why can't a knight of faith also have it? I think that both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard have valid points. The overman's worship of this world, a world made beautiful by God Himself, is justified. It's courageous to find happiness in a meaningless world. The knight of faith's authentic anticipation of the next is equally justified as long as such faith doesn't interfere with living an authentic life while here on earth. The overman is not inferior to the knight of faith and the knight of faith is not inferior to the overman. They are both authentic, subjective existing individuals, living life the fullest way they know how, both courageous in their own ways. They are both equally superior in courage to all the slave moralists, master moralists and mock Christians of the world. And while I live here on earth, neither the overman nor the knight of faith can discredit the other, since there may or may not be an afterlife. The lacking evidence of an afterlife doesn't suggest there isn't one. Where would be the challenge in believing in something I know to exist? Likewise the very notion of Christianity defying common logic tempts me to doubt the faith it is so hard for me to have.